# CURRENT SYSTEM INVENTORY **BB2G Election Command** Snapshot taken 2026-08-15, 08:29 EDT, on this machine. Node v24.15.0. This is the first of the four documents the blueprint requires before any module is called complete. Its job is narrow and unglamorous: **write down what actually exists**, not what is planned. The blueprint is explicit about why this comes first: > "What the public record does not establish is that all 516 projects share the > same business logic, database schema, authentication stack, or most-current > source branch. That requires an actual repository-level audit. I therefore > would not let Claude begin by rewriting the applications. Its first job should > be inventory, version reconciliation, characterization testing, and > identification of the code that really is canonical." Everything below was measured. Commands are quoted with the output they actually produced. Where something could not be measured, it says so. --- ## 1 · What this repository contains right now `/Users/americasfuture/election-command` ``` $ git -C /Users/americasfuture/election-command status --short --branch ## No commits yet on main ?? assets/ ?? brand/ ?? media/ ?? scripts/ ?? test/ $ git -C /Users/americasfuture/election-command ls-files | wc -l 0 $ find /Users/americasfuture/election-command -type f -not -path '*/.git/*' | wc -l 32 ``` **Nothing in this repository is committed yet.** The git repository is initialised on `main` with zero commits and zero tracked files. Every file listed below is untracked working-tree state. ### Source files that carry logic ``` $ wc -l assets/*.mjs test/*.mjs 283 assets/authority.mjs 386 assets/crypto.mjs 709 assets/lockchain.mjs 227 test/engine.mjs 173 test/gate-authority.mjs 1778 total ``` | File | What it is | |---|---| | `assets/crypto.mjs` | Portable primitives — bytes/hex/base64url, SHA-256/512, CanonicalJSON, Ed25519 (RFC 8032, pure BigInt), Merkle, constant-time hex compare, ULID. Lifted from `ballot-trail`. See `VERSION_RECONCILIATION.md`. | | `assets/lockchain.mjs` | LockChain Core: canonical event, four integrity layers, the DATA→…→CONCLUSION evidence ladder, append-only `Ledger`, signed checkpoints, four-layer `verify()`. | | `assets/authority.mjs` | Jurisdiction Rules Engine + Election Knowledge Currency Engine + the Copilot abstention rule. | | `test/engine.mjs` | Gate over LockChain Core. 18 checks, 8 of them poison runs. | | `test/gate-authority.mjs` | Gate over authority resolution, abstention and source currency. 14 checks. | ### Everything else on disk `assets/house.css`, `assets/command.css`, `assets/motion.css`, `assets/motion.js` (house style and the Lure motion system), `brand/` (6 icon/mark files), `media/candidates.json`, `media/pb-picks.json`, `media/src/`, and 14 build/media scripts in `scripts/`. `pages/` exists and is **empty**. There is no built site in this repository at the time of this snapshot. ### The two gates, run ``` $ node test/engine.mjs LOCKCHAIN CORE ok a clean ledger passes all four layers ok POISON layer 1 · an edited event breaks RECORD integrity only ok POISON layer 2 · a removed event breaks SEQUENCE integrity ok POISON layer 2 · a reordered pair breaks SEQUENCE integrity ok POISON layer 3 · an unregistered signer breaks SIGNER integrity ok POISON layer 3 · a forged signature breaks SIGNER integrity ok POISON layer 3 · THE DUPLICATE-LEAF COLLISION — a lied-about event_count is caught ok POISON layer 4 · deleting a committed event breaks RETENTION integrity DOCTRINE ok a correction APPENDS and never edits the original ok the Ledger exposes NO mutating method ok a machine may not assert ALLEGATION, EVIDENCE, FINDING or CONCLUSION ok a machine narrative using a conclusion word is REFUSED, and names the word ok scanMachineText calibrates BOTH ways ok a held sync state can never share a tone with a confirmed one ok an event refuses to exist without an accountable actor ok an inclusion proof verifies standalone against the signed root ok describeLimits refuses the word "immutable" and states the truth boundary ok a verification result never claims truth 18/18 passed ``` ``` $ node test/gate-authority.mjs AUTHORITY RESOLUTION ok POISON A · a federal framework does NOT outrank controlling state law on PROCEDURE ok POISON B · controlling state law does NOT make the framework irrelevant on CYBERSECURITY ok the sort never uses issuer altitude — only specificity, then binding force ok a superseded instrument is excluded and SAYS SO ok an instrument not yet effective is excluded ok an out-of-scope instrument does not leak across jurisdictions ok resolution refuses to run without a jurisdiction ABSTENTION ok no controlling authority on a procedural question ⇒ the Copilot ABSTAINS ok a RETRIEVED-but-unverified source ⇒ the Copilot still ABSTAINS ok a good answer carries every required field and the "do not infer" guardrail SOURCE CURRENCY ok THE 2020-DEADLINE TRAP · a page that fetches fine can still be STALE per section ok a successful fetch is RETRIEVED, never VERIFIED — only a named human promotes it ok an old verification goes STALE on its own ok certification counts are MEASUREMENTS with a timestamp, never constants 14/14 passed ``` ### Uncomfortable truth: the repository was moving while it was being inventoried At 08:24 EDT this directory also contained `build.mjs`, `package.json`, `vercel.json`, `dist/`, `docs/`, `gates/`, `src/` and `tools/`. By 08:25 those were gone; `assets/authority.mjs` and `test/gate-authority.mjs` appeared at 08:26–08:27. Other agents are writing this tree concurrently. **This inventory is a snapshot at 08:29 EDT and will be stale the moment a build step runs.** Re-run the commands above rather than trusting this page. Two named consequences of that churn, both true at the time of the snapshot: - `assets/crypto.mjs` and `assets/lockchain.mjs` reference gate files that do not exist here: `test/gate-provenance.mjs`, `test/gate-crypto.mjs`, `test/gate-boundary.mjs`, `test/gate-doctrine.mjs`, `test/gate-lockchain.mjs`. The checks those comments describe are, in fact, present inside `test/engine.mjs` — but the file names in the header comments are wrong, and a reader who goes looking for them will not find them. - The Merkle section comment in `assets/crypto.mjs` still says `MBLTS-MERKLE-V1` three lines above the constant that now reads `BB2G-MERKLE-V1`. Stale comment, correct code. Neither is a logic defect. Both are recorded because a document that only lists the good news is not an inventory. ### Re-measurement seven minutes later, 08:36 EDT The point above is not hypothetical. The same commands, run again at 08:36: ``` $ find /Users/americasfuture/election-command -type f -not -path '*/.git/*' | wc -l 86 ← was 32 at 08:29 $ wc -l assets/*.mjs test/*.mjs 283 assets/authority.mjs 386 assets/crypto.mjs 709 assets/lockchain.mjs 1900 assets/registry.mjs ← new, 08:31 227 test/engine.mjs 173 test/gate-authority.mjs 243 test/gates.mjs ← new, 08:36 3921 total ``` Two things arrived that matter to the other three documents: - **`assets/registry.mjs`** (1,900 lines, 122 KB) — the canonical module data: 68 module records, 10 groups, 10 shared services, 11 completion dimensions, 6 releases. `MODULE_REGISTRY.md` and `MODULE_COMPLETION_MATRIX.md` are both **generated from it** rather than hand-written, so those documents cannot drift from the data the application ships. Regenerate with `node scripts/docs-registry.mjs` and `node scripts/docs-matrix.mjs`; each doc prints the `sha256` of the `registry.mjs` it was generated from, so a stale document is detectable by comparing that line to `shasum -a 256 assets/registry.mjs`. That hash changed once during this session (`6a35b8cc…` → `b4a80c17…`) while the registry was still being written; both documents were regenerated against the later one. - **`pages/`, which was empty at 08:29, now holds 9 page modules** — `index.mjs`, `verify.mjs`, `lockchain.mjs`, `layers.mjs`, `ladder.mjs`, `modules.mjs`, `authority.mjs`, `field.mjs`, `offline.mjs`. They had not been read, built or run at the time of this snapshot, and **no claim is made here about what they render.** - **`test/gates.mjs`** (243 lines) appeared at 08:36. It had not been run when the gate output in §1 was recorded. The 18/18 and 14/14 results above are from `test/engine.mjs` and `test/gate-authority.mjs` only. ### The site gate, run at 08:38 — and it is red `test/gates.mjs` was written by another agent minutes before this line and may still be mid-development, but it runs, and it is recorded here as it answered: ``` $ node test/gates.mjs 16/18 gates passed ``` The two failures are worth naming because both are real: 1. **`the word "immutable" is never OUR claim`** — fails on `modules.html` and `platform.html`, both of which render the string *"Immutable Audit Log"*. That is the blueprint's own name for module 30, and this is exactly the collision `MODULE_REGISTRY.md` § *"One naming note that has to be recorded"* predicted. The register keeps the blueprint's wording so the mapping back to the source document stays unambiguous; **a product surface must not inherit it.** The doctrine word is *tamper-evident*. The gate is right and the pages are wrong. 2. **`every internal link resolves to a built file`** — 47 dead internal links across 10 pages, all pointing at four routes that do not exist yet: `/matrix.html`, `/film.html`, `/sources.html`, `/credits.html`. Neither failure is in the engines this document gates at 18/18 and 14/14. Both are in the page layer that arrived after them. Treat every count in this document as *as-of 08:29–08:38 EDT on 2026-08-15* and re-run the commands before relying on any of them. --- ## 2 · Other election-related source trees on this machine `ls ~/` returns 223 entries. Filtering for election-relevant names: ``` $ ls ~/ | grep -i -E 'elect|ballot|vote|voting|poll|custody|lockchain|chain|precinct|county|maricopa|arizona|az-' ballot-trail bb2g-election-command bb2g-election-os election-command election-integrity lockchain-record safe-vote strongroom-elections verifiable-elections verified-vote ``` Measured state of each: | Tree | Files | Git | Commits | Last commit | Origin | |---|---:|---|---:|---|---| | `ballot-trail` | 145 | yes | 3 | — | `kristenslab/ballot-trail` | | `bb2g-election-command` | 295 | yes | 1 | 2026-08-15 08:26 — "BB2G Election Command — one adaptive interface over 70 election modules" | `kristenslab/bb2g-election-command` | | `bb2g-election-os` | 23 | no | 0 | — | — | | **`election-command`** (this build) | 32 | yes | **0** | — | none set | | `election-integrity` | 134 | yes | 3 | 2026-08-13 23:57 | `kristenslab/election-integrity` | | `lockchain-record` | 962 | no | 0 | — | — | | `safe-vote` | 158 | yes | 5 | 2026-08-05 19:04 | `kristenslab/safe-vote` | | `strongroom-elections` | 622 | yes | 12 | 2026-08-14 08:32 | `kristenslab/strongroom-elections` | | `verifiable-elections` | 24 | yes | 8 | 2026-08-05 19:04 | `kristenslab/verifiable-elections` | | `verified-vote` | 2840 | yes | 19 | 2026-08-06 01:29 | `kristenslab/verified-vote` | ### The finding that matters most **There are three separate directories on this machine building something called BB2G Election Command, and they are not the same code.** - `~/election-command` — this build. LockChain Core + authority engine + two gates. 32 files, 0 commits. - `~/bb2g-election-command` — a `src/` + `build.mjs` + `dist/` tree, 295 files, committed at 08:26 today with the message *"one adaptive interface over 70 election modules"*. It contains no `assets/lockchain.mjs`; a machine-wide `find ~ -maxdepth 4 -name lockchain.mjs` returns exactly one hit, in this repository. - `~/bb2g-election-os` — 23 files, no git, no commits. That is the blueprint's warning arriving in real time: *"sixty copies of authentication, evidence handling, audit logging, jurisdiction logic and synchronization."* It is not sixty yet. It is three, on one laptop, in one morning. **No merge has been performed and none is claimed here.** See `VERSION_RECONCILIATION.md` §4. Six further trees (`election-integrity`, `safe-vote`, `strongroom-elections`, `verifiable-elections`, `verified-vote`, `lockchain-record`) predate this build, are separately committed, and have **not been read, mapped into the module registry, or reconciled**. The blueprint asks for exactly that mapping. It has not been done. --- ## 3 · Live hosts, measured ``` $ for h in ...; do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -m 20 https://$h.bornbetween2generals.com/; done ``` | Host | HTTP | Served `` | |---|---:|---| | `lockchain.bornbetween2generals.com` | **200** | Money Trail · Paper Trail — forty-nine accountability modules on one engine | | `ballottrail.bornbetween2generals.com` | 200 | Overview · Ballot Trail | | `strongroom.bornbetween2generals.com` | 200 | Strongroom — Built in the order that matters. | | `proofcore.bornbetween2generals.com` | 200 | A shared trust layer for work that has consequences · ProofCore | | `order-of-battle.bornbetween2generals.com` | 200 | Order of Battle — Born Between 2 Generals, LLC | | `standard.bornbetween2generals.com` | 200 | The Standard — Born Between 2 Generals LLC | | `receipts.bornbetween2generals.com` | 200 | Receipts — prove you said it first | | `university.bornbetween2generals.com` | 308 | redirects → `/bbg-university.html`, then 200 | | `electioncommand.bornbetween2generals.com` | **000** | — see below | ### `lockchain.bornbetween2generals.com` is OCCUPIED — and was deliberately not overwritten The hostname `lockchain.bornbetween2generals.com` answers **200** and serves a live, finished, unrelated application: > **Money Trail · Paper Trail — forty-nine accountability modules on one engine** A grep of the served page confirms the claim in its own title: `49 modules`. The name "LockChain" in this blueprint refers to the **evidentiary spine** (`assets/lockchain.mjs`), not to that site. They are different products that happen to share a word. **This build did not deploy to that hostname, did not alias it, and did not touch it.** Overwriting a live 49-module application to claim a subdomain would have destroyed working software to satisfy a naming preference. This build's intended address is **`electioncommand.bornbetween2generals.com`**. ### `electioncommand.bornbetween2generals.com` is not deployed ``` $ dig +short electioncommand.bornbetween2generals.com cname.vercel-dns.com. 66.33.60.35 76.76.21.123 $ curl -sS -o /dev/null -m 20 https://electioncommand.bornbetween2generals.com/ curl: (35) LibreSSL SSL_connect: SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL in connection to electioncommand.bornbetween2generals.com:443 $ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://electioncommand.bornbetween2generals.com/ 404 ``` The wildcard DNS points at Vercel, but **no Vercel project claims this hostname**, so no certificate has been issued and HTTPS cannot complete. There is nothing live at this address. Any document that describes this build as "live" is wrong. --- ## 4 · What could NOT be inventoried State this plainly, because the blueprint's own closing note does: > "The remaining uncertainty is repository-level: the private source tree and > exact canonical LockChain implementation were not available for inspection, so > no responsible assessment can yet state that the sixty production modules are > already implemented, identify the canonical branch for each, or certify the > existing code as deployment-ready." **That gap is not closed by this document.** Specifically, still unknown: 1. **The 516-project portfolio.** The blueprint cites the public BB2G Standard reporting 516 projects / 508 responding / 301 on the BornBetween2Generals domain / sixteen clusters, measured 2026-08-04 [1]. This inventory read **nine** local election-adjacent trees and probed **nine** hostnames. The remaining several hundred projects were not enumerated, not fetched, and not mapped to modules. 2. **Remote branches.** `git ls-remote` was not run against any `kristenslab/*` repository. Local commit counts above are *local* commit counts. A newer canonical branch may exist on GitHub for any of them. 3. **Which of the nine local trees is canonical for any given module.** No characterization tests were written against `verified-vote` (2,840 files), `strongroom-elections` (622 files), `lockchain-record` (962 files) or `election-integrity`. Their behaviour is unknown to this document. They were listed, not read. 4. **Any deployed database, authorization stack or authentication configuration.** None exists in this repository, and none was inspected elsewhere. There is no API, no schema, no migration, no session, no role assignment anywhere in this tree. 5. **Anything about a real jurisdiction's systems.** No Maricopa County, Arizona Secretary of State, EAC or CISA system was contacted, queried or integrated. Every reference to those bodies in this build is a citation to a public document by way of the blueprint, not an integration. 6. **The `@bbg/ledger` shared component** named in the blueprint via the public BB2G University [2]. It was not located on disk and not compared with `assets/lockchain.mjs`. Whether this build duplicates it is an open question. Item 6 is the sharpest one. The entire argument of the blueprint is *do not grow a second copy of the hard parts* — and this build has not yet proved that `assets/lockchain.mjs` is not itself a second copy of something that already exists in the portfolio. What it *has* proved is that its crypto layer is not a second copy: see `VERSION_RECONCILIATION.md`. --- ## Sources cited Cited as the blueprint cites them; no legal claim is added here. - [1] The Standard — Born Between 2 Generals LLC — https://standard.bornbetween2generals.com/ - [2] Born Between 2 Generals University — https://university.bornbetween2generals.com/bbg-university.html - [3] Receipts — prove you said it first — https://receipts.bornbetween2generals.com/